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FORENSIC DISCOVERABILITY OF IOS
VAULT APPLICATIONS
Alissa Gilbert, Kathryn Seigfried-Spellar
Purdue University, gilbera@purdue.edu, kspellar@purdue.edu

ABSTRACT
Vault Applications store potentially sensitive information on a smartphone; and are available
on Android and iOS. Using these applications could be used to hide potential evidence or
illicit photos. After comparing five iOS photo vaults, each vault left evidence and photos
behind. However, of the three forensic toolkits used, each produced different results in their
scans of the phone. The media left behind was due to the photo vaults not protecting their
information as claimed and using basic obfuscation techniques in place of security controls.
Future research will look at how newer security controls are implemented and if they are
easily discoverable.
Keywords: vault apps, sexting, privacy, digital forensics, iOS forensics

1.

INTRODUCTION

Sexting has become more commonplace in
mobile communications, which led to many
vault apps appearing on mobile phone application stores, such as the App Store for
iPhones. Vault applications have gained media attention stating these vault apps help
keep your private photos safe. Previous research suggests that 40% of Android vault
applications stored passwords in cleartext,
and one third did not encrypt photos (Zhang,
et al., 2017). These findings suggest that iOS
applications may also not live up to their
standards. If vault applications securely conceal private photos, they should not be easily
found when imaged forensically. The following study describes the use of vault applications and their effectiveness in hiding and
securing the user’s private photos.
© 2021 JDFSL

2.

LITERATURE
REVIEW

2.1

Vault Applications

The world has become dependent on digital sources of information, and the use of
computer-based systems has been common
intoring, processing, and transmitting data
(Palmer, 2001). A drive for the progress of
technology is correlated to an increase in public dependency on it and has led to the further integration of technology into daily life
(Oriwoh, et al., 2013). As the number of solutions provided by technology increases, the
amount of information stored about an individual subsequently increases (Palmer, 2002).
This has raised concerns for security and privacy for the vast amount of generated user
data. While ways to secure and hide data
are consistently being developed (Garfinkel,
2010), one such implementation is "vault applications."
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These vault applications store information
privately on laptops, personal computers, mobile phones, and tablets (Newton, 2018). The
most common use of vault applications for
photo vault storage of sensitive or sexual uses
(Lovejoy, 2017). There are multiple photo
vault applications available to users on all
mobile devices. These applications allow the
user to securely store personal data, which
makes it difficult for anyone except the device’s owner to view the files even if they
have access to the device (Zhang, et al., 2017).
These mobile vault applications often disguise
themselves by pretending to look like other
applications or only displaying information
when they enter a valid password (Newton,
2018).
These images need to be kept securely
for personal privacy and to avoid any unwanted malicious activity towards the sender.
Similarly, due to the frequent use of phones,
users may also possess pictures of sensitive
or personally identifiable information (such
as social security numbers, passports, healthrelated information, and others). An additional layer of security and privacy is added
to a person’s device (Newton, 2018).
On the contrary, it is also possible for malicious actors to use these applications to hide
pictures that may be illegal or show illegal
activity. For example, a criminal may store
sexually explicit images of children or pictures relating to an illegal sale of drugs on
these vault applications. In such cases, vault
applications may serve as a hindrance to law
enforcement. Vaults are developed to safeguard a user’s privacy and hide personal data
but can also be misused to hide any incrimination files in case of a crime. This means
the implications of such applications need to
be viewed from a user security perspective
and investigative anti-forensics standpoint
(Zhang, et al., 2017).
In previous research on Android devices,
vault applications were easily discovered by
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digital forensic toolkits. In a study by
Michaila Duncan and Umit Karabiyik, all
64 of their investigated vault apps were detected during forensic analysis. While the
researchers expected to find all unencrypted
data, more advanced tools were able to decrypt images and locate them, leading to a
100% success rate on recovery (2018). Android has more options for jailbreaking, apps
available, removable media, and other opportunities that make it easier to investigate many applications versus a more limited
phone with limited storage.

2.2

Relevance to Investigations

During investigations, law enforcement is
much more likely to encounter a suspect with
a mobile device than a computer (Marturana,
et al., 2011). Mobile forensics can reveal a significant amount of data ranging from an individual’s communication to their travel habits
(Tassone, et al., 2013). Mobile devices contain the most relevant evidence per gigabyte
(SANS, 2019). This has caused an increasing
demand for the analysis of forensic artifacts
of interest on mobile phones (Palmer, 2001).
In addition, forensic artifacts extracted from
mobile devices could serve as evidence in both
civil and criminal court cases (Adams, et al.,
2008).
For mobile devices acquired during an investigation, vault applications may be present
on the suspect’s phone, which may be used to
hide any incrimination files in case of a crime.
Zhang (Zhang, et al., 2017) describes a case
in which around half of the students from
a Colorado high school used "calculator-like
vault applications to distribute and hide hundreds of nude photos of themselves." In such
cases, while traditional digital forensic tools
may be able to recover photos directly stored
on the phone, they may not be able to find
those secured by photo vaults (Zhang, et al.,
2017). Due to these vault applications, it is
necessary to assess what kinds of information
© 2021 JDFSL
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can still be recovered forensically and find
new ways to extract actionable information
despite these anti-forensic measures.

2.3

iOS Application Testing
Methods

2.3.1

Forensics of mobile devices.

Mobile phones contain gigabytes of information about the user’s behavior, location, contacts, interests, and beliefs (Abdulla Alghafli,
et al., 2012). In the case of vault applications, information the user wants to keep private. Al-Zarouni (Al-Zarouni, 2006) stated
the main issues with extracting and analyzing information from mobile technology: it
requires specialized interfaces, storage media,
and hardware. Similarly, the file system resides in volatile memory, requiring the phones
to be powered on for analyses; each phone
contains different operating systems based on
the type and file system in place (Al-Zarouni,
2006).
Based on methods used to acquire data
from mobile phones, acquisition methods can
be classified into four basic categories: manual, logical, physical, and chip-off (Abdulla
Alghafli, et al., 2012). The manual acquisition is the simplest method to gather data
off the phone, as it involves using buttons
and keypads to browse through the phone’s
contents manually. This method will be ineffective, as all vault applications require
some password or authentication mechanism,
which the investigator would not be aware
of (Newton, 2018). Most existing tools in
digital forensics use logical extraction, which
involves retrieving information in the logical
partitions of the mobile phone’s memory (Abdulla Alghafli, et al., 2012). This research
study utilized logical acquisition as it was the
only available method. The physical acquisition of phones is based on "copying the entire physical memory locations of the phone
memory chip." A chip-off involves reading
© 2021 JDFSL

data from the chip to acquire the internal
non-volatile memory. The success of these
methods is dependent on the file and operating system, as well as if the device requires
successful authentication for the user to gain
access (Jansen Ayers, 2007).
2.3.2

iPhone forensics

Since iPhones make up a large portion of the
phone market, multiple studies have been
conducted on iPhones and data extraction.
Based on logical extractions of iPhones, Mutawa and colleagues (Mutawa, et al., 2012) as
well as (Awan, 2015) could recover multiple
forensics artifacts of value from common social media platforms such as user and friend
data, profile pictures, timestamps, comments
and posts, and in some cases, chats and cookies. Yang, Dehghantanha, Choo, and Muda
(Yang, et al., 2016) as well as Husain and
Sridhar (Husain Sridhar, 2009), were able to
extract information from instant messaging
applications such as AIM, Yahoo Messenger, and Google Talk on iPhones and extract
information such as login credentials, login
metadata, and conversation history. Thirdparty applications from devices, such as the
iPhone, contain a significant amount of data,
and proper analysis can prove beneficial to
an investigation (Levinson, et al., 2011). A
forensic analysis of an iPhone can also uncover deleted files. Like a computer, deleting
the file will only delete the link to the file or
the data (Zdziarski, 2008).
While the extraction of such information
was possible with older iPhones, Apple has
made it harder to gain access to a user’s
iPhone (Norouzizadeh Dezfouli, et al., 2016).
When acquiring images from iPhones, the
logical method is always possible, but the
overall data acquired is limited; full physical
acquisition is not possible on most iPhones
(Jansen Ayers, 2007). However, the physical method always works on iPhones that
have been jailbroken by the user (Abdulla
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Alghafli, et al., 2012). Physical acquisition
is still possible on iPhones below iPhone 5s,
and a significant amount of data can be found
on file system dumps of iPhones containing
iOS version 9 and below. Beginning with
iOS version 10.3, it is harder for current tools
to extract several information files successfully unless the iPhone is jailbroken (Hoog
Strzempka, 2015). The iPhone in this study
was past iOS 9 and could not be analyzed
physically, only logically.
Some newly updated tools can extract relevant information from iPhones, but cannot
link them to an application; manually parsing
through the files could still provide investigators with valuable data (Yang, et al., 2016).
Since the filesystem was completely changed
in iOS 11 to Apple’s own creation and limited
literature exists on iOS 11, it is difficult to say
how it will affect the extraction and analysis
of iPhones. As an additional complication,
users are now required to enter the phone
passcode or backup password each time an
iPhone with iOS 10.3 or above is plugged into
a computer (Newton, 2018). This makes it
more difficult for investigators, as they would
need to obtain the password from the suspect
to access the phone. However, researchers
such as Iqbal, Iqbal, and Al Obaidli (Iqbal, et
al., 2012) are developing tools to acquire and
analyze Apple devices without jailbreaking
the device.
In terms of this study, these struggles with
iPhone forensics might impact the study’s
photos acquisition. Without the phone being
jailbroken, the results and accuracy of the acquisition might be skewed in that some of the
evidence was left behind (i.e., not recovered).
2.3.3

iPhone Vault testing

Generally, information about third-party applications can be found in the User Data
partition of the iPhone device, which should
be similar in the case of the vault-based applications (Levinson, et al., 2011). While
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limited literature exists on vault applications,
a recent study by Zhang (Zhang, et al., 2017)
analyzed vault applications on Android devices. Their results showed that around 67%
obfuscated the vault code, and around 28%
used native libraries, which negatively affected reverse-engineering the code for breaking into the applications. Zhang, however,
was still able to find and view hidden data
on the device without having any privileged
access on the phone. Approximately a third
of the vaults did not encrypt photos, while
nearly 44% did not encrypt videos; ∼40%
also stored the password in cleartext. It was
also possible to break into some of the vault
applications by swapping the password file
with a custom one (Zhang, et al., 2017). Since
no such testing is performed on the iPhone
and iOS ecosystem, we conducted a similar
study for commonly used vault applications
on iPhone devices.

3.

METHODS

To test the privacy and effectiveness of the
vault apps, a mix of photos were assigned to
multiple vault apps, then analyzed forensically to see what artifacts would be left by
the application. If the vault apps were to
maintain security and privacy for the images,
there should not be a readable copy of the
picture on the phone. This would also be successful if a photo is found but encrypted. The
vault application failed when we found the
"hidden" photos as readable objects where a
basic imaging processor determined the image content. Ideally, the file name should not
be discovered as well.

3.1

Photos

Nature photos were obtained from Creative
Commons under the Attribution (cc-by). Different file name structures were also changed
to observe any modification from the vault
applications. See Figure 1 for the variations
© 2021 JDFSL
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Figure 1. Photo Vault Apps and Evidence
Acquisition
of photo names. Nature images that did not
include pictures of people were used as benign
test images. These images were under the
cc-by license, which allowed for convenience.
These photos were then added to the iPhone
without additional image artifacts, such as
thumbnails or copies. Any copies found were
at the creation of the vault applications.

3.2

Experiment Design

An iPhone SE (A1662) on iOS 11.3 was used
to test popular vault apps from the App
Store. Five popular applications were installed; KeepSafe, Photo Vault, Calculator
+, Secret Safe, and Purple photo vault. In
Fall 2019, these vault applications were selected as they were the top results in the
Apple App Store and were most downloaded
by Apple users. These names are the application name from the App Store, but they have
different names for folder names inside iOS.
KeepSafe keeps its respective name, Photo
Vault is also called enchanted cloud, Calculator + is also secret Calculator, Secret Safe
is loveyouchenapp, and Purple photo vault
is also referred to as galaxy studio. Each
application received four similar jpegs and
received the jpeg image, respectively.
In order to assess the applications, three
forensic software packages were used; UFED
Cellebrite (v. 7.23), Magnet Axiom (v. 3.8.0),
© 2021 JDFSL

and Black Bag Mobilyze 2019 R1. While this
study did not compare the tools, it should be
noted that not all tools produced the same
results. The twenty images were added to
the phone and then imaged through the three
respective forensic applications. In order to
access any cross interactions from the other
applications, 20 different images were used
and assigned to the specific vault application
to store the image. This would make it easier
to see if the application modified the images
or if a thumbnail is created. If the forensic
application finds all artifacts, five dedicated
images should be found per application.
Cellebrite, Axiom, and Mobilyze have different features that may discover artifacts
from the applications, such as pin codes,
thumbnails, preview videos, or file names.
Thus, more than one acquisition method was
used.

4.

RESULTS

Each app’s key indicators of success or failure
were given an abbreviated letter and character between the five vault applications and
the three different forensic software. This
summary can be seen below in Figure 2. The
scope of this research is not to determine
if any of the forensic software packages are
more effective than others in finding mobile
forensic artifacts. Cellebrite, Axiom, and
Mobilyze shared similar results. In order to
minimize redundancy, an entire breakdown of
Cellebrite will be included to give further context to the summary in Figure 2. Cellebrite
Physical Analyzer displayed the results from
the extraction.

4.1

Summary

To compare the different types of evidence
between each vault and forensic tool, the
discovery indicators were described between
them. The following letters indicate each
item in the key for Figure 2:
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A = Application discovered by forensic software
C = Passcode found
E = Photos were found encrypted
F = Facebook tracker found in-app
L = Live video preview image found
M = Multiple copies of the same photo were found
N = No photos found
P = All four photos were discovered
R = Original photos still found in the camera roll
T = Thumbnails/Preview Found

While Cellebrite and Axiom had all twenty
photos in the iOS default photo gallery, Mobilyze did not recognize photos assigned to
KeepSafe and Calculator + and did not find
these applications on the phone. It is assumed that these eight missing pictures are
in the default photo gallery, as suggested by
the two other software packages. Overall, Mobilyze found the least amount of information
from the vault applications, suggesting that
using more than one forensic application to
analyze the same image of the iPhone provides the most correct and whole picture of
what evidence is on the phone.
Axiom did not find the 20 images in
the camera roll for the vault applications.
Cellebrite found all of them, and Mobilyze
could only find three out of the five apps,
with these three apps having their twelve respective pictures found during analysis. At
first glance, Cellebrite found the most results
between the three applications and was the
only application to find one of the passcodes
from the photo vault app Photo Vault (enchanted cloud). As Cellebrite found the most
forensic artifacts, Table 3 describes what ev-

Figure 2. Evidence Found per Vault App and
Forensic Tool
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idence was found for each application, the
file name (to show any modifications), the
description of the photo-matching to Figure
1, and the location in Cellebrite where the
evidence was found.
The package names of applications vary
from their names as displayed in the app store.
This created difficulty in analyzing matching
different applications as the Cellebrite, Axiom, and Mobilyze found them versus how
they display to users.

4.2

Thumbnails

The modification of the file names lends some
information about how each vault application is storing each photo. For example, Calculator + stored each private photo as an
entry in an SQL database and makes a custom file named . . . ZTHUMBNAIL instead
of creating a thumbnail file with the designated thumbnail file extension .thumb such
as KeepSafe. This may provide some forensic
protection as using the common file extension
will cause other forensic software tools not
to find the thumbnail, where the thumbnails
with the designated file extension were found.
For example, KeepSafe used the .thumbs file
extension found in Cellebrite and saw that
Axiom also discovered it. While Cellebrite
found the custom thumbnail file for secret
Calculator, both Axiom and Mobilyze did
not find these thumbnails, displaying that
this type of obfuscation that the vault app
provides is effective against some forensics
software packages, but not all of them. Photo
Vault (enchantedcloud) created a photo for
a thumbnail to be viewed in the app, but
it did not create a thumbnail file nor did it
create a filename without a file extension. It
created another image file, a jpeg like the
original picture, but changed the file’s name
to designate to the application that is it a
thumbnail picture.
© 2021 JDFSL
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Figure 3. Forensic Artifacts found by Cellebrite

© 2021 JDFSL
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4.3

Other Artifacts

Referencing Figure 2 shows one of the features examined if multiple copies of the same
photo were found. Copying the sensitive
photo to be viewed by the vault application
caused more evidence to be found forensically.
The .mov files were found from images taken
on the iPhone with its built-in camera, which
created a live preview of the images as a short
video.
Private Photo Vault’s pin number was
found in plaintext by Cellebrite but was not
found by the other forensic applications. This
code was verified as the correct pin to unlock
the phone. Other applications, such as KeepSafe, also had four-digit pin codes to unlock
the vaults, but they were not found during
the investigation. Additional copies of some
private photos were created as .png files, another image type, and stored on the phone,
creating more evidence to be found by the
forensic tool. Frequently, these applications
create more evidence and do little to obscure
or secure private images.

5.

CONCLUSION

Based on the current study, vault apps provide minimum protection from forensic analysis. Their primary usage should be to obscure sensitive photos from other users of the
mobile device, not to provide important additional security or privacy for these private
photos. While some techniques were effective
at hiding evidence from some forensic software packages, the forensic applications themselves were the greatest contributing factor
as to whether evidence was located on each
phone. The software packages that found the
most evidence was Cellebrite, while the app
that provided the greatest protection was
Calculator + (secretCalculator). However,
Cellebrite was able to find all of the photos
and metadata for the photos from Calculator
Page 8

+ and all five applications and the twenty pictures were discovered. Future research should
investigate more effective methods of hiding
and securing photos, including a cloud-only
solution for vault applications that do not
store the image locally, but instead, they are
stored off of the device via the cloud. Finally,
reviewing the literature on other vault applications, these results are similar to previous
research which also found 100% of the artifacts from Android vault applications (Duncan Karabiyik, 2018).

5.1

Future Work

In response to the proliferation of sexual messages and images, vault applications are becoming popular. Future research should examine other platforms, which claim to protect sensitive images, as well as the ability
of other forensic tools to identify probable
data. These newer apps should be compared
singularly on Android and iOS similarly to
these vault applications, while adding an additional phase to test new vault application
features that these applications claim to use,
such as AI image detection. Ultimately, continued research in this area will address not
only the security and privacy of vault applications but their potential role in digital
forensic investigations.
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